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POST-COVID-19 WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

Inequality and Workforce Development in
Maine in the Post-COVID-19 Environment
by Thomas Remington

workers unequally. Most of those working
in professional and business services have
The COVID-19 pandemic has stricken American workers deeply, causing widereturned to work, whereas workers on the
spread layoffs and accelerating the longer-term disappearance of jobs available
front lines of retail trade, in the healthcare
to workers with limited skills and education. As a result, its impact has exacerbatservices, and in the leisure and hospitality
ed inequalities of income and opportunity. A long-term strategy for postpandemindustries have seen deep employment
ic economic development in Maine will require building bridges from existing
losses (US BLS 2021). Nationally, the
skill sets to jobs offering greater employment opportunity and security. Existing
unemployment rate for those with at least
research shows that when income and security are addressed as a shared rea four-year college degree rose from 2
sponsibility on the part of workers, employers, and taxpayers, economic growth
percent to 4 percent, but for people with
can expand opportunity and reduce inequality. Maine can take advantage of the
less than a high school degree, it rose from
COVID-19 crisis to restructure the institutional environment in ways that will align
5.7 percent to 9.1 percent. The unemploythe incentives of the public and private sectors and will achieve these goals.
ment rate for African Americans is higher
still, 9.2 percent.
A telling indicator of how the
pandemic
has
affected
the workforce is the labor force
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND
participation
rate,
defined
as the share of the working-age,
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
noninstitutionalized civilian population that is employed
or unemployed but seeking work. Labor force participaThe National Perspective
tion in the United States fell significantly from the late
he COVID-19 pandemic and the recession it has
1990s until a tightening labor market began pushing wages
caused have exacerbated existing inequalities of income
higher in 2016. According to the US Bureau of Labor
and opportunity by race, ethnicity, gender, and place of
Statistics, as workers dropped out of the labor force during
residence. As of January 2021, the national unemployment
the pandemic, the rate fell from 63.4 percent to 61.4
rate was 6.3 percent, down from the peak of 14.8 percent
percent and still more for African Americans (62.4 percent
in April 2020, but higher than the 3.5 percent rate in
to 60 percent) (US BLS 2021).
January 2020 (Falk et al. 2021; US BLS 2021). However,
Although the aging population largely explains the
employment recovery has been highly unequal. As of
declining rate of labor force participation in recent
January 2021, over half of jobs lost were low-wage jobs,
decades, young people—and particularly young men—
almost four times as many as the number of high-paying
have been exiting the workforce, which is a symptom of
jobs lost (CBPP 2021). A result of this pandemic job loss
larger problems in the labor market. Fewer jobs available to
was that far more women lost their jobs than did men. At
low-education workers pay a living wage. As geographic
the outset of the pandemic, more women held jobs than
mobility has declined, more workers are dropping out of
did men, but as of a year later, one million more women
the labor force altogether (Abraham and Kearney 2018).
than men had lost jobs (Ruiz 2021). Moreover, women
This trend is also visible in the rise in social anomie and
were disproportionately affected by the closing of schools
disengagement, which are reflected in rising rates of drug
and childcare facilities, which forced many women to quit
abuse and “deaths of despair” (Case and Deaton 2020).
jobs and stay home with children (Alon et al. 2020). The
The association between the loss of employment opportupartial recovery also affected low-wage and high-wage
nity and socio-psychic stress is evident from the geographic
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and demographic distribution of deaths from suicide,
alcohol abuse, and opioid overdoses, which have been
highest among white males in the regions hardest hit by
the loss of decent-paying jobs. The pandemic has deepened
these trends. According to the Centers for Disease Control,
the 12-month period from May 2019 to May 2020 saw the
highest number of deaths from drug overdoses ever
recorded in a one-year span. The pandemic, however, was
not the only factor in this increase; overdose deaths were
rising in 2019 as well.1 Still, the COVID-19 pandemic has
burdened the most vulnerable members of society with
even heavier economic and psychological stress.
Low-wage workers compose a large share of the country’s workforce—44 percent as of January 2020—and have
been more severely affected by the pandemic than higherearning workers (Escobari et al. 2019).2 Layoffs threaten
their security in several ways, including the loss of housing
and of health insurance (Garfield et al. 2020). Even before
the pandemic, about a quarter of those living in rental
housing were paying more than half their gross monthly
income on rent. By January 2021, about 20 percent of all
renters had fallen behind on their rent payments; 40 percent
of children in households that rented faced difficulty with
food, housing, or both (CBPP 2021; Dougherty 2021).
Approximately 30 million people work in the retail
and hospitality fields, almost 20 percent of the total US
labor force. Most of those people work at wage levels below
the median wage (77 percent in retail, 93 percent in hospitality). These are the most vulnerable jobs: wages are low,
health insurance coverage is sparse, and the COVID-19
pandemic has led to heavy job losses. Whereas from
January 2020 to January 2021, the unemployment rate
rose from 4 percent to 6 percent for all workers, it only rose
from 2.5 percent to 3.4 percent for people working in
financial services but from 5.9 percent to 15.9 percent for
those in leisure and hospitality (US BLS 2021). Low-wage
workers are the least likely to be able to switch to online
work; their educational levels tend to be low; and they are
disproportionately likely to be female, Black, and Hispanic.
The COVID crisis, therefore, is dealing a severe, multifaceted blow to the low-wage segment of the workforce.
Low-wage workers are not only the most likely to be
laid off, they are also the most likely to lose employment-based health insurance or to lack it in the first place.
Loss of employment due to the pandemic means that close
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to 27 million people are at risk of losing their health insurance (Garfield et al. 2020). In principle, a majority of these
individuals may become eligible for Medicaid or for
marketplace subsidies through the ACA but only in those
states that have expanded Medicaid. And a certain share of
them will not be eligible for ACA subsidies due to income
level or citizenship status.
For industries that were already losing jobs, the
pandemic has accelerated a painful transition and intensified the harsh social and economic consequences of our
high and rising inequality. High inequality in the distribution of economic and social opportunity produces a
gradient in health. Research shows that there is a direct
relation between socioeconomic status and health, whether
measured as the number of healthy days people experience
in a month or in terms of their overall health status (Case
and Deaton 2020). Health levels vary systematically for all
racial and ethnic categories by income and education. This
is true of geographic inequality as well.
Across the country, the impact of the pandemic has
varied systematically by population group, industry, and
geography (Bahar 2020). People living in densely populated areas and particularly in multiperson, multigeneration
households or congregant living facilities are at greater risk
for becoming infected and spreading infection more
widely. People working in jobs requiring a high, prolonged,
and intensive level of face-to-face contact, such as assembly
line manufacturing, food processing, retail sales, and
personal care services, are similarly at higher risk. Groups
that have been systematically disadvantaged in access to
good housing, health care, education, and job opportunities—particularly minority and immigrant groups—are at
greater risk from the illness due to higher underlying rates
of hypertension, heart disease, diabetes, poor nutrition,
and other chronic conditions (Owen et al. 2020). Where
these risk factors linked to geography, industry, and
demography overlap, clusters of illness develop and spread
at especially high rates.
Maine and the Economic Impact of COVID-19
In some respects, the COVID pandemic has affected
Maine in the same ways it has affected the rest of the
country, while in other respects, the impact on Maine is
distinctive. In recent decades, the labor market in Maine
has been slightly tighter than that of the country as a whole
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figure 1:

Maine and US Labor Force Participation Rates
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Source: FRED of St. Louis (https://fred.stlouisfed.org); US Bureau of Labor
Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/lau/).
Percentage of civilian labor force recorded as employed.

figure 2:

Maine Metro Areas Unemployment Rates,
1999–2019
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and unemployment slightly lower (Figure 1). However, in
most years, the labor force participation rate has been
lower in Maine. During the pandemic, Maine’s registered
unemployment rate did not rise as sharply as the country’s.
However, its labor force participation rate fell still more.
The long decline in Maine’s labor force participation rate is
driven in part by the aging of Maine’s population, but also
by lagging wages and increasing rates of dropouts from the
labor force on the part of youth, especially those with lower
educational levels (Breece et al. 2015). From 2000 until
2015, youth nonparticipation rates in Maine rose—even
when unemployment began to fall as the overall economy
picked up following the Great Recession.
Around 20 percent of Maine’s workforce is employed
in service jobs such as food service, cleaning and building
maintenance, retail sales, hospitality services, and warehousing; 40 percent of these workers live in families with
an income under twice the poverty line (compared with
about 25 percent of Maine’s population overall) (Chaganti
et al. 2020). During the pandemic, these jobs have been
severely affected due to the slump in tourism. The hardest-hit industries, measured by unemployment insurance
claims, have been transportation, sales, food preparation
and service, hospitality, and health care. Construction,
sales, education, and office jobs have also been severely
affected. Overall, Maine lost about 16 percent of all jobs
(CWRI 2020). Moreover, a large number of people who
are unemployed are not being counted as unemployed; in
many cases, they are classified as “employed, not at work,”
rather than unemployed. The true unemployment rate in
Maine was probably around double the reported rate as of
mid-June (18 percent vs 9.3 percent) (Valigra 2020).3
Maine also has a higher rate of unincorporated
self-employed workers than the country as a whole (about
10 percent vs 7 percent) (CWRI 2011) as well as a higher
rate of multiple job holders (7.5 percent vs 5 percent
nationally in 2018) and a higher rate of part-time workers.4 Maine’s unemployment rate also varies substantially
across regions. Figure 2 shows the rates for the three metropolitan regions of the state, Portland, Bangor, and the
Lewiston-Auburn area.
The loss of jobs in Maine’s leisure, hospitality, and
retail sectors has been substantial. In a state heavily dependent on seasonal visitors, the state’s quarantine restriction
on out-of-state visitors has dealt a serious blow to Maine’s
dining and hospitality sectors. These immediate effects,
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however, have been exacerbated by the longer-term trends
of declining manufacturing employment and population
aging. From 2000 to 2018, the share of Maine’s workforce
employed in manufacturing fell from almost 17 percent to
just over 10 percent).5 Meanwhile, the median age has
been rising, from 38.7 in 2000 to 44.9 in 2018 (compared
with the national median age of 37.8), and Maine’s population has grown older at a faster rate than the country’s as
a whole.
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figure 3:

Top Income Shares in Maine and US (Pretax),
1917–2017
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As manufacturing and related jobs have disappeared,
wages for unskilled and semi-skilled workers have stagnated. The pay scales for construction workers, laborers,
maintenance workers, machinists, those working in
personal care and services, and other production occupations have hardly risen over the last decade. Likewise
lower- and mid-level managers have had hardly any
increase in pay. Only top-level managers, the top decile,
have seen significant wage increases. The share of households in Maine receiving more than $100,000 rose almost
50 percent in the last decade, rising from 14 percent to
more than 20 percent of the population. This rate of
increase was even faster than that for the United States as a
whole. Meantime, the number of households in the middle
brackets fell, as did the number in the lowest income
brackets. So while income growth has reduced the poverty
rate, it has not built a larger middle class. Figure 3 shows
that Maine has followed the national trend in the concentration of incomes at the top, although Maine has a lower
share of extremely high-income households.
Rising economic inequality—the fact that bottomand mid-level incomes have stagnated while top-level
incomes have steadily risen since the late 1970s—directly
affects economic opportunity and mobility. The economy
has increased geographic sorting of households by neighborhood and town. As incomes in rural and small-town
communities have fallen behind and metropolitan communities and affluent neighborhoods within them have
become more prosperous, the gap between the social and
educational backgrounds of families are reproduced across
generations (Reardon 2011). Better-off families pass on
their advantages to their offspring; struggling families are
left with a diminishing social safety net and the steady
privatization of public goods such as education and health
care (Chetty et al. 2014, 2017; LaRochelle 2020). The
result is that economic inequality by socioeconomic category is closely related to economic inequality across towns
and regions. Together, they widen disparities, close off
opportunity, and fuel social polarization.
This point is evident in the crisis caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic. Maine being hit so hard by the
economic effects of the pandemic despite having relatively
low infection rates underscores the threat of long-term
economic inequality to both public health and national
prosperity. The prevalence of precarious and low-wage
employment leaves many Maine workers vulnerable to the

0.4
Maine: top decile

0.3

0.2

US: top 1%

0.1

Maine: top 1%

1920

1940

1960

1980

2000

2020

Source: https://wid.world/.

spillover effects of the pandemic on employment and
income security. Policies aimed at reducing disparities in
the distribution of income, security, and opportunity will
reduce inequality, protect public health, and stimulate
economic growth. Much of the current public discussion
has focused on the disparate health and economic effects of
the pandemic on minorities and urban areas, where longterm inequality trends have intensified health and economic
vulnerability. However, the economic impact of the
pandemic is also acute wherever economic precarity and
inequality have hollowed out public goods provision. For
this reason, economic inequality, employment opportunity, and social security must be seen as interrelated facets
of a single problem. A workforce strategy coupling skill
formation, employment opportunity, and income security
will therefore spur both short-term economic recovery and
longer-term economic development.
LINKING SKILL, EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY, AND INCOME SECURITY

O

ur World War II-era system of employer-based
health insurance has been failing for many decades as
part-time, short-term, and gig forms of work have spread
(Thelen 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic, which forced
many workers out of their jobs with the potential loss of
employer-sponsored health insurance, has accelerated these
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figure 4:
increasing
Long-term trends in employment

trends. However, even if the structure of employment were
to return to the status quo ante following the end of the
pandemic, we would still confront the reality of highly
unequal incomes, falling social mobility, and high levels
of precarious employment. Therefore, it is important to
construct new institutional linkages among employment,
opportunity, and security, taking into account long-term
trends in the labor market. To analyze how this might be
done, we can employ a conceptual framework proposed by
the Brookings Institution (Bahar 2020).
In this framework, occupation types are classified
along two axes. The horizontal axis represents the immediate impact of the pandemic on employment; the vertical
axis shows the longer-term trends in employment.
Occupations experiencing high layoff rates due to the
pandemic lie at one end of the horizontal axis; occupations
with low layoff rates lie at the other. Along the vertical axis,
jobs seeing a long-term increase in demand are at the top,
and jobs for which employment has been declining over
time are at the bottom. For occupations suffering high
losses due to COVID but long-term increasing labor
demand, economic recovery will likely drive an expansion
in employment, especially if physical distancing is possible.
Examples include the construction trades, health care, and
social assistance. However, other occupations suffering
heavy losses are unlikely to see much increased employment since they have been losing jobs over a longer time
(e.g., retail clerks and clerical and data entry wokers). A
third category, occupations that have seen growing demand
over time and fewer recent job losses, include jobs allowing
work from home, for example, in information-intensive
industries such as finance and logistics. Additionally some
occupations have been losing employment for a long time,
but are less immediately affected by COVID-19. Examples
include jobs that can be automated, such as drafting and
engineering technicians (see Figure 4).
Maine’s case is consistent with national trends.6 Figure
5 shows Maine Department of Labor projections of
expected changes in employment by occupation between
2016 and 2026. These projections do not reflect the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, but they do suggest
how longer-term economic trends have been affecting
labor demand. Job growth is likeliest in employment
requiring personal service, while the greatest number of
lost jobs are expected to be in sales, production, and
administration. Job losses are concentrated in occupations
where wage levels are lower, such as retail and hospitality,

declining

Typology of Occupations by Long- and
Short-Term Labor Market Demand

Financial managers
(information intensive;
can work remotely)

Construction trades;
Healthcare technicians

Drafting, engineering
technicians (work can be
automated)

Retail clerks; office
clerical & admin workers

fewer layoffs

more layoffs

Effect of pandemic on employment
Source: Bahar (2020).

whereas job gains tend to be greatest in higher-paying
occupations, such as in finance and professional services.
However, some of the occupations with the highest
projected employment growth rates are those requiring
skilled personal service in the health sector, such as physical
therapists, phlebotomists, physician assistants, and nurse
practitioners. In these occupations, employment is likely to
be affected by the pandemic in the short term, but over the
long run, labor demand in these occupations is likely to
rise again.
Therefore, a long-term strategy for reforming the link
between employment and security must build bridges from
existing skill sets to jobs offering greater employment
opportunity and security in the postpandemic labor
market. There are two sides to this task: provision of appropriate training and career navigation to equip workers for
new employment and guarantees of income security to
induce workers to equip themselves for new careers (cf
Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Iversen and Stephens 2008).
With respect to the first challenge, research on
patterns of job transitions suggests some possibilities
(Escobari et al. 2019). A worker in an office setting
performing clerical work in many cases already uses office
software. Such a worker could perform similar work at a
managerial or supervisory level, in customer support, or as
a system administrator. These roles are also in demand in
expanding industries such as health care and software
development.
However, there is no reason to expect that labor
market supply will adjust quickly or automatically to

MAINE POLICY REVIEW • Vol. 30, No. 2 • 2021

POST-COVID-19 WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

figure 5:

Projections of Labor Market Change in Maine

on the part of individual workers, employer
groups, educational institutions, and local governStatisticians
ments (Maguire et al. 2010; Osterman 2018;
Physician assistants
Nurse practitioners
Respiratory therapists
Roder and Elliott 2019).
Information security analysists Software developers, applications
20
One approach is to focus on the transition of
youth from schooling to the workforce by establishing public-private partnerships that link
0
secondary education, postsecondary education, and
credential attainment with workplace-based
-20
learning. Such partnerships require the private
Data entry keyers
sector to invest in efforts to bring youth into the
Word processors & typists
workplace (through internships and apprentice-40
ships) and the public sector to use its policy tools
Respiratory therapy technicians
(educational program requirements, tax credits,
-60
local infrastructure investment) to create the incen0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
tives to induce private sector involvement. The
			 Median Annual Wage, 2017
most effective public-private partnerships are institutionalized in intermediary organizations that
Source: Maine Department of Labor, Center for Workforce Research and
integrate economic development with workforce
Information.
development (Conway and Giloth 2014).
Intermediaries work to build closer ties betweem
match demand. Research shows that markets for skill are
educational institutions at all levels—from middle school
inefficient and slow to clear. The supply of people qualithrough college—and employer associations.
fied for medium- and high-skill jobs may fail to respond
In recent years, the number of programs seeking to
to market signals for a number of reasons, including the
overcome
these market imperfections has expanded nationeffects of inequality in blocking social mobility (Fuller et
ally
and
in
Maine. An example in Maine is the Bridge
al. 2014). As a result, the United States wastes an enorAcademy,
which
enables high school students to acquire
mous amount of human potential and leaves millions of
college
credits
and
career-oriented credentials.7 The objecpeople stuck in a recurrent cycle of low-wage work, intertive of such programs is to ensure that when high school
mittent employment, poverty, and discouragement
students graduate, they have a certain minimum number
(Boushey 2019). European coordinated market econoof college-level academic credits, a certain number of
mies suffer far less from such problems due to elaborate
credits in career and technical education (CTE) courses,
long-term partnerships among labor unions, employers,
and meaningful workplace learning experience. Studies
and governments to coordinate education and training
show that students who graduate from these programs have
with labor market demand. This coordinated effort
measurably higher rates of high school completion as well
ensures social protection to encourage the joint investas greater success in obtaining jobs that offer good wages
ment in skill on the part of workers and employers
and opportunities for upward advancement. At the same
(Remington 2018). Even in a more market-driven system
time, research shows that they only succeed in the presence
such as in the United States, local institutional mechaof deep and sustained involvement on the part of school
nisms for matching the supply and demand of
and business partners. If either schools or employers (or
appropriately skilled workers have been shown to alleemployer associations) treat such a program as a short-term
viate such market imperfections—improving job
solution, the program will not achieve its goals (Beadle
opportunity and reducing inequality. The literature also
2019). A fuller description of these sorts of programs may
shows that interventions at the individual level in the
be found in Remington (2020).
form of assistance with training and navigating the search
Even before the pandemic struck, there was a sense of
for a new job are costly in both material and organizacrisis
with regard to workforce development in Maine.
tional terms. They require cooperation and commitment
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Business leaders reported an acute shortage of new recruits
for jobs in many occupations, both middle- and high-skill.
A broad coalition of business, government, civic, and
educational leaders agreed on a goal of raising the attainment of useful skills such that by 2025, 60 percent of
Maine’s workforce should be equipped with a meaningful
credential—a certificate or a diploma from a two- or fouryear postsecondary institution.8 Currently the rate is only
43 percent (MDF 2018).
The classic model of meaningful workplace-based
learning is apprenticeships. As of 2019, the number of
active apprentices was only 633,000, less than 0.4 percent
of the US workforce.9 In the last decade, however, the
number of apprenticeships in the United States has
doubled. Likewise, in Maine the number of apprenticeships has risen since the 2018 election (Maine DOL
2019). As the state plans its postpandemic economic
recovery, it could enlist more of Maine’s most prominent
employers, organizations, and trade associations to expand
training options. As recent federal grant funds are providing
Maine with $18 million to expand the apprenticeship
program in the state, there is a real opportunity to match
the state’s workforce needs and economic development
strategy with the expansion of opportunity for Maine’s
citizens to enter high-paying careers with good prospects
for advancement.
Similarly, the state can take advantage of the current
economic crisis to encourage employers and organizations
to create internships and other workplace-based learning
opportunities when apprenticeships are not feasible.
Internships are less administratively burdensome, although
the return on investment is also lower. Some high schools
in Maine now require all students to do an internship as a
condition of graduation (Old Orchard Beach High School
is an example). Again, the state can facilitate the expansion
of internships by offering employers small tax credits for
offering internships.
Broadly speaking, the link between economic recovery,
long-term development, and skill upgrading should focus
on improving employability rather than protecting jobs.
Efforts to improve skill levels—both hard and soft—that
expand employment opportunity must be thought of as
investment in people rather than employment. It is also
important to recognize that the short-term urgency of
reducing unemployment can come at the price of a deeper
investment in training. To adapt to the increasingly rapid
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pace of technological change, workers will require a deeper
and broader body of foundational knowledge along with
the ability to apply it to a changing set of tasks. They will
need to be able to build on that foundation and acquire
new skills as job requirements change. The evidence from
successful workforce development programs shows that
taking a long-term perspective on skill formation, by
investing in the person rather than the job, is not only
more equitable from the standpoint of individual opportunity, it is also more efficient in the long-run for employers
and society because it reduces the waste of human potential (Holzer 2011, 2017).
The other side of investment in people, however, is to
reduce income insecurity (Hund-Mejean and Escobari
2020). This includes protection against the loss of income
from unemployment and the lack of health care. As with
co-investment in skill upgrading and career navigation,
income and health security need to be thought of as a
shared responsibility on the part of workers, employers,
and taxpayers (Hanauer and Rolf 2015).
One widely discussed proposal is portable benefits. A
system of portable benefits can be tailored narrowly or
broadly. The general idea is to let workers pay into personal
accounts that are part of broader risk pools for health or
unemployment insurance. These programs serve those who
are self-employed or who change jobs, and they relieve the
individual worker of dependence on an employer for basic
income and health protection. Portable benefits systems
can also be adapted to encourage individual effort to
upgrade skills or to pay for child care in order to make
employment or training possible. They have several
features: the benefits are tied to the individual, not to the
employer; they are pro-rated, so that if a person works for
more than a single employer, each employer pays a portion
of the contribution corresponding to the number of hours
worked; and they are universal, i.e., they are accessible to
all workers. They can be financed in various ways (including
through surcharges on customers or through individual
and employer contributions), but the funds are pooled and
the accounts are administered at the state level.10
An example is the New York State Black Car Fund.
On-demand livery drivers contribute to a state workers’
compensation fund financed by a 2.5% surcharge on each
ride.11 The fund operates as a statewide nonprofit organization administering health and safety benefits for drivers of
on-demand car services, such as the traditional black car
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livery services and more recently Uber and Lyft drivers.
The benefits include health care, disability and death benefits, wellness classes, vision care, and defensive driving
courses.
Such programs can be readily adapted for other social
insurance needs for independent contractors and other
self-employed workers. Several states, among them
Washington and Massachusetts, are considering similar
programs. One promising extension of such systems would
be to use them not only for social insurance—disability,
unemployment, health care—but also for training and
childcare expenses through a system of credits. People who
provide personal services, such as hairdressers and barbers,
or self-employed mechanics and technical services
providers, could also benefit from such portable benefits
programs by adding a small surcharge on each transaction.
Likewise, those who work on a contract or part-time basis
for multiple employers could take advantage of such a
system by ensuring that a small percentage of the wage be
paid into a notional individual-defined account that
finances healthcare, disability, unemployment, training,
and childcare benefits. As the economy slowly recovers,
workers who have lost income and health insurance could
be given both greater income security and a chance to
improve their qualifications for a wider array of employment opportunities. Moreover, such portable benefits
programs could be made part of a larger nationwide system
of active unemployment assistance, such as that recently
proposed by Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro (2020). Their
plan would provide individualized employment benefits
covering both unemployment and assistance in retraining
and job relocation, folding the current state-based system
into it.
During the current pandemic, Maine has seized the
initiative to address the challenges of rebuilding the workforce to respond to the problems of changing labor market.
A successful strategy will take planning for the long term,
not just coping with the immediate effects of the
COVID-19 crisis. The effort will require cooperation and
institutionalized partnerships between the public and
private sectors. In May 2020, Governor Mills convened an
Economic Recovery Committee to advise her on the best
ways to respond to the immediate crisis. The committee’s
final report, published in November 2020, emphasized the
importance of developing Maine’s workforce by expanding
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access to postsecondary education and opportunities for
workplace-based learning, improving early childhood care
and education, ensuring universal access to broadband
communications technologies, increasing access to stable
housing, and widening inclusion of underserved populations into society (OPIF 2020). The report was linked to
the state’s 10-year economic development strategy, which
proposes to increase the number of high-paying jobs in
value-adding industries, building on Maine’s traditional
strengths in farming, fishing, and forestry (Maine DECD
2019). Therefore, Maine has a window of opportunity to
take advantage of the crisis created by the pandemic—the
short-term crisis provoked by the COVID-19 pandemic
accelerating the longer-term crisis of an aging workforce—
to restructure the institutional environment in a way that
aligns the public and private sector incentives around
trajectories of economic growth that reduce inequality. The
state can take advantage of this moment of crisis to deploy
the new funds made available by the federal and state
government to devise new pathways that expand opportunity for individuals who have been left behind by the
economic trends of the past four decades while at the same
time enabling Maine to achieve longer-term economic
development goals.
NOTES
1

According to the CDC, “Over 81,000 drug overdose deaths
occurred in the United States in the 12 months ending in May
2020, the highest number of overdose deaths ever recorded
in a 12-month period.…While overdose deaths were already
increasing in the months preceding the…pandemic, the latest
numbers suggest an acceleration of overdose deaths during
the pandemic.” https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/
p1218-overdose-deaths-covid-19.html

2

Low-wage workers are defined as those earning less than
two-thirds the median hourly wage for full-time, full-year male
workers, adjusted for local cost of living.

3

https://www.maine.gov/labor/cwri/qcew.html;
https://www.maine.gov/labor/cwri/ui.html

4

https://www.maine.gov/labor/cwri/cps.html

5

https://www.maine.gov/labor/cwri/qcew.html

6

https://www.maine.gov/labor/cwri/outlook.html

7

https://www.bridgeacademymaine.org/

8

https://mainespark.me/about-mainespark/

9

https://www.doleta.gov/oa/data_statistics2019.cfm
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10 More information about portable benefits is available in
Fitzpayne and Greenburg (2018), Steward et al. (2019), HundMejean and Escobari (2020), Maxim and Muro (2018).
11 https://www.nybcf.org/about
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